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I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appeilants (collectively "Defendants") 1 have previously
set forth the facts and procedural background of this case in their Combined Response Brief and
Opening Brief ("Defendants' Combined Brief'). Defendants intend this Reply Brief to address
only those issues related to Defendants· Appeal. However, the Appellants/Cross-Respondents
Nathon A. Baughman and Melissa K. Baughman (collectively "Baughmans") Combined Reply
and Response Brief ("Baughmans' Combined Brief') does not clearly identify many of the
issues but rather overlaps arguments frequently. Therefore, if this Reply Brief appears to treat an
issue outside the parameters of the Defendants' appeal, that is only because Defendants have
been unable to untangle the arguments in the Baughmans' Combined Brief and find it necessary
to respond.
The only issue on cross-appeal ("Cross Appeal Issue") is: "Whether the District Court
erred by holding that the statute of limitations to foreclose a deed of trust, as set forth in Idaho
Code§§ 5-214A and 45-1515, begins to run upon acceleration of the promissory note secured by
the deed of trust." R. Vol. III, p. 812,

,r 3.

The Baughmans apparently only address the Cross

Appeal Issue in Section 11.1. of the Baughmans' Combined Brief, so this Reply Brief is primarily
focused on that particular section. Baughmans' Combined Brief, pp. 6-14.

1 The

Appellants' Opening Briefreferences these parties inconsistently as either "Defendants" or
"Respondents." Compare Opening Brief, p. 6 § I.A. to § I.B. The Baughmans' Combined Brief
uses the term "Banking Entities" to describe the same parties.
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II.

A.

ARGUMENT

The Baughmans Offer No Interpretation of the Idaho Statute to Support their
Position on the Appropriate Statute of Limitations Trigger Under a Deed of Trust.

The Cross Appeal Issue is inextricably entwined with Idaho Code §§ 5-214A and 451515, which together form the statute of limitations for enforcing a deed of trust. Defendants'
initial briefing of the Cross Appeal Issue sets forth in great detail the tenets of statutory
interpretation and the legislative history for Idaho Code § 5-214A. See Defendants' Combined
Brief§ III.A.(1), pp. 8-20. As far as Defendants have been able to find, the language in Idaho
Code§ 5-214A is unique.2 Despite this, the Baughmans offer no guidance to this Court relating
to statutory interpretation. Nor do the Baughmans dispute any of the principles of interpretation
set forth by Defendants.
The Baughmans fail to contest or even address the Defendants' following arguments:
1.

Enforce the Terms of the Contract.

The contract between the parties contains a hard definition of "Maturity Date" as
March 1, 2047. The contract does not define Maturity Date to include the due date after
premature acceleration, as it could have and as some instruments actually do. This Court should
enforce the contract of the parties as written. Defendants' Combined Brief§ III.A.(1 )( a), pp. 1012, and authorities cited therein.

2

Defendants did not audit the statutes of limitations in all 50 states. However, Defendants found
a few states with language similar to the Idaho statute before its last amendment. See, e.g., Or.
Rev. Stat. § 88.110 (Oregon); Minn. Stat. § 541.03 (Minnesota); Cal. Civ. Code § 882.020
(California). No statutes could be found with identical language to the Idaho statute with
West/aw word searches.
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2.

Use the Plain Meaning of the Statute.

This Court should interpret Idaho Code §

14A according to its plain meaning. The

plain meaning requires that the term "maturity date" in the statute be interpreted within the
context of the entire statute. Maturity date therefore means stated maturity date.

Here, the

Maturity Date stated in the obligation is March 1, 204 7. Again, the contract does not state that
Maturity Date includes a date due after acceleration. Defendants' Combined Brief§ III.A.( 1)(b),
pp. 12-14.

3.

Do Not Render Statutory Language Meaningless.

If the Court finds Idaho Code § 5-2 l 4A ambiguous, it may use other principles of
statutory interpretation. One of those principles is that a statute must not be interpreted in a way
that makes some language meaningless. If the term "maturity date" in the first sentence of the
statute includes maturity after default and acceleration, the entire second sentence of the statute
has no point. This results because the second sentence already triggers the statute of limitations
after default (and therefore, always upon acceleration) only (f no other maturity date is stated.

3

Defendants' Combined Brief§ III.A.(l )( c )(i), pp. 14-15.

3

Where a specific maturity date is stated (i.e., a situation that does not apply to demand notes),
acceleration only happens after default. Under automatic acceleration clauses, default and
acceleration always happen together. Under optional acceleration clauses it is possible that a
default exists without acceleration. On the other hand, acceleration cannot exist unless an event
of default also exists. So unless the contract states otherwise, every time there is acceleration,
there has already been a default.
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4.

Legislative History Supports Defendants' Interpretation.

This Court may also look to legislative history to aid in statutory interpretation. The
legislative history of Idaho Code § 5-2 l 4A indicates that the legislature intended a statute of
limitations trigger on default only if the obligation does not state a maturity date. The obligation
here clearly states the Maturity Date is March 1, 204 7, and therefore the statute of limitations
trigger for the deed of trust is not default but March 1, 2047. Defendants' Combined Brief
§ III.A.(l)(c)(ii), pp. 15-16.

5.

Interpret Deed of Trust Statutes' Language Consistently.

The term "maturity date" contained in Idaho Code § 5-214A does not mean "due by
reason of default" because otherwise the legislature would have used this language-as it did in
another section of the deed of trust statutes. Another section of the Idaho deed of trust statute
regarding redemption, Idaho Code Section 45-1506, uses the terms "due by reason of default"
and "acceleration."

If the legislature had intended these concepts to trigger the statute of

limitations for deeds of trust, it would have used the same words.

It did not. Defendants'

Combined Brief§ III.A.(l)(c)(iii), pp. 17-18.
6.

A Long Statute of Limitations is Consistent with Idaho Law and Policy.

Due to the unique circumstances of this case, the statute of limitations for enforcing the
promissory note is not an issue. 4 This case only involves the statute oflimitations to foreclose a

4

The Baughmans received a bankruptcy discharge of the unsecured portion of the debt, which
otherwise could have been recovered by a deficiency action on the promissory note under Idaho
Code § 45-1512. Therefore, Defendants are only seeking to enforce the deed of trust which
survives the bankruptcy. Defendants' Combined Brief, p. 8, n. 51.
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deed

trust A long statute

limitations

law and policy. Defendants' Combined Brief§ III.A.(l)(c)(iv), pp. 18-20.
To illustrate this point further, other states likewise have law and policy that support a
long statute of limitations to foreclose a deed of trust. For example, under California common
law, there was historically "no time limitation on the exercise of the power of sale in a deed of
trust." Ung v. Koehler, 135 Cal. App. 4th 186, 190, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311,312 (2005) (emphasis
added). This changed in 1982 with the enactment of new California legislation that currently
permits nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust up to 60 years after the date of recording the
deed of trust. Specifically, California Civil Code Section 882.020 states in pertinent part:
(a)
Unless the lien of a mortgage, deed of trust, or other
instrument that creates a security interest of record in real property
to secure a debt or other obligation has earlier expired pursuant to
Section 2911, the lien expires at, and is not enforceable by action
for foreclosure commenced, power of sale exercised, or any other
means asserted after, the later of the following times:
( 1)
If the final maturity date or the last date fixed for payment
of the debt or performance of the obligation is ascertainable from
the recorded evidence of indebtedness, 10 years after that date.
(2)
If the final maturity date or the last date fixed for payment
of the debt or performance of the obligation is not ascertainable
from the recorded evidence of indebtedness, or if there is no final
maturity date or last date fixed for payment of the debt or
performance of the obligation, 60 years after the date the
instrument that created the security interest was recorded.
Cal. Civ. Code § 882.020.
Idaho law, which does not allow quiet title against an unpaid deed of trust, is remarkably
similar to California common law, which provided that a deed of trust had no statute of
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note

73

249

81

817 (1952); see also Defendants· Combined Brief, p. 19 (citing Idaho cases holding that a
mortgagor cannot quiet title where he has not tendered payment on his loan).

Even after

enacting a statute of limitations, California still allows 60 years for foreclosure. This period is
longer than the maximum limitation period proposed by Defendants here, five years from the
stated maturity date which equates to 45 years after execution of the deed of trust. Both Idaho
and California law reflect a policy that the conveyance instrument of real property (deed of trust)
lives longer than the negotiable instrument (promissory note) it secures.
Notably, the California statute also clearly provides that the maturity date or last day of
payment must be ascertainable from the public record. The acceleration date after default, being
an unknown future event, could not be ascertainable from record unless arguably a notice of
default was recorded.

California law here is consistent with the interpretation proposed by

Defendants that the term "maturity date" in the statute necessarily means the clearly defined

stated maturity date.
Overall, interpreting Idaho Code § 5-214A to provide for a statute of limitations five
years after a note's stated maturity date (here, March 1, 2047) is consistent with the law and
policy in Idaho and other states. This is true even where, as in this case, the statute oflimitations
would not bar foreclosure of the deed of trust until over 40 years after breach of the promissory
note.
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B.

The Case Law Cited by the Baughmans Predates the Idaho Deed of Trust Statute of
Limitations, is Distinguishable, or Supports Defendants' Position.
The Baughmans' Combined Brief cites a handful of cases that purport to support their

position on the Cross Appeal Issue. However, upon closer analysis all the cited authorities fail to
support the Baughmans' arguments for one reason or another. Some of the Baughmans' cases
actually support the Defendants' position. This section briefly sets forth most of the cases cited
in the Baughmans' Combined Brief which are patently inapplicable for a variety of reasons.
Many of the cases below apply to analysis of the statute of limitations under a promissory note,
which is not the issue before this Court.
a.

United States v. Dos Cabezas Corp., 995 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993)

(Baughmans' Combined Brief, pp. 6-7), is cited for the proposition that an automatic acceleration
upon default starts a statute of limitation. The premise cited is dicta because the case deals with
the statute of limitations for a post foreclosure deficiency action, not the exercise of a power of
sale or foreclosure.

In fact, in making that distinction, this case actually held that "[t]he

foreclosure action itself is not subject to any limitations period." Id. The statute of limitations
under the promissory note is different than that under the deed of trust. Further, the quotation
addresses automatic acceleration and limitations on installment payments, neither of which is an
issue in this case.
b.

Martin v. Pioneer Title Co. of Ada Cty., No. 96438, 1993 WL 381101, at

*2 (Idaho Dist. July 8, 1993) (Baughmans' Combined Brief, p. 10), is cited for the proposition
that the running of the statute oflimitations on a deed of trust is triggered by a default. This case
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involved the extended statute
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"). The case did not address the
issue here and did not distinguish between a default under the note and deed of trust. The
primary issue was whether the assignee of a note was subject to the same statute of limitations as
the FSLIC, which is clearly not an issue in this case.
c.

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of

California, 522 U.S. 192, 209, 118 S. Ct. 542, 552, 139 L. Ed. 2d 553 (1997) (Baughmans'
Combined Brief, p. 10), involved a unique statute of limitations under federal pension law that
specifically states it runs from the date the cause of action arose. By its express terms, the Idaho
limitation on deeds of trust only runs from the date of the cause of action if there is no stated
maturity date.
d.

Canadian Birkbeck Inv. & Sav. Co. v. Williamson, 32 Idaho 624, 186 P.

916, 918 (1920) (Baughmans' Combined Brief, pp. 10-11 ), is cited for the proposition that the
accrual of the cause of action starts the statute of limitations. This case is from 1920, before
enactment of the current statute, when the general statute of limitations for contracts applied.
See C.S.1919 § 6609, now codified at Idaho Code§ 5-216. 5 That statute did state that accrual of
the cause of action started the running of the limitation period but it no longer applies to deeds of
trust in Idaho. In addition, the case involved an automatic acceleration clause on real property
located in Canada.

5

See Addendum to this Brief.
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e.

Gebrueder Heidemann,

A.M.R.

107 Idaho

688 P.2d

1180 (1984) (Baughmans' Combined Brief, p. 11 ), is cited because it "deals with a deed of trust
without a maturity date." 6 In fact, this case dealt with a mortgage, not a deed of trust. Further,
the Court found that the mortgage had become valueless, and therefore allowed an action on the
note without foreclosure. The limitations analysis was about the promissory note, not the
mortgage.
f.

In re Solutia Inc., 379 B.R. 473, 484 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)

(Baughmans' Combined Brief, p. 11 ), is cited for the proposition that acceleration changes the
maturity date. This case applies federal bankruptcy law and New York law to the issue of
whether an automatic acceleration clause was effectively de-accelerated under the terms of a
trust indenture.

For the purpose of the analysis, the New York bankruptcy court found it

necessary to distinguish the "Stated Maturity Date" from the accelerated due date. Id. at 478.
g.

Am. Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Kesler, 64 Idaho 799, 137 P.2d 960, 962

(1943) (Baughmans' Combined Brief, pp. 11-12), is given as a citation for the statement: "It is
black letter law that the maturity date of a loan is advanced when the loan is accelerated." This
case analyzed the statute of limitations to enforce a promissory note after foreclosure of the deed
of trust. The limitation on enforcement of a promissory note is not an issue in this case. Also,
the case was decided before the statute relevant here was enacted.

6

The Baughmans' Combined Brief does not clearly explain the argument intended to be
supported by this statement. In the same paragraph, the Baughmans cite Elliott v. Darwin
Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 69 P.3d 1035 (2003). However, the premise for which Elliott is
cited is even less clear and therefore, not addressed here.
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1

402,

(Baughmans · Combined Brief, p. 12), is cited for a definition of maturity when applied to
commercial paper. Once again, the issue in this appeal involves the limitations period for the
limitation on the promissory note, is not an issue in this appeal. Additionally, the primary issue
in Brown related to negotiable instrument law for presentment and notice of dishonor pursuant to
a municipal ordinance in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
C.

The Baughmans Completely Fail to Address the Notification Component of
Acceleration.

The District Court held that acceleration of the promissory note must " ... clearly and
unequivocally put the Baughmans on notice that the Note was being accelerated." R. Vol. III, p.
631 (emphasis added).

Yet, the Baughmans continue to insist that acceleration must have

happened upon some secret date cryptically noted in a file deep in the bowels of internal records
maintained by Defendants. Compare Baughmans · Combined Brief, pp. 9-10, with In re Crystal

Properties, Ltd., L.P. 268 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[A] party having an option to declare
a note due and payable cannot simply by his own secret intention, never disclosed by act or
word, claim that he declared the note due and payable.") (citations omitted). The Baughmans'
position here ignores the requirement that the Baughmans receive notification of acceleration.
As far as Defendants can tell, the Baughmans do not ever take the position that the District Court
was wrong in finding that clear and unequivocal notification was an element of acceleration.
Moreover, the case law cited in the Baughmans' Combined Brief supports the District
Court analysis that clear and unequivocal notification is a required element of acceleration. See,
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re

Brief;

8. The

specific terms of the promissory note m Crystal Properties required acceleration before
imposition of default interest. The question in Crystal Properties was whether and when
acceleration occurred allowing the lender to charge default interest. The court found that under
California law, " . . . even when the terms of a note do not require notice or demand as a
prerequisite to accelerating a note, the holder must take affirmative action to notify the debtor
that it intends to accelerate." Id. at 749 (emphasis added). The Crystal Properties court cited
several decisions finding that notification is a required element, in some instances even if the
contract language provides that the debtor waives notice of acceleration. Id. at 749-750 (citing
United States v. Cardinal, 452 F. Supp. 542, 54 7 (D. Vt. 1978) ("The law is well settled that

where the acceleration of the installment payments in cases of default is optional on the part of
the holder, then the entire debt does not become due on the default of payment but affirmative
action by the creditor must be taken to make it known to the debtor that he has exercised his
option to accelerate, even though the note itself, as is the case here, waives notice of demand.")
(emphasis in original); (citing Moresi v. Far W Servs., Inc., 291 F. Supp. 586, 588 (D. Haw.
1968) ("It is well established that to exercise an option to accelerate the maturity of a note the
holder must take some affirmative action that evidences its intention to accelerate. . . This
requirement applies even where the note provides for acceleration 'without notice."').
After setting forth the analysis of the applicable law, the Crystal Properties court went on
to analyze several notices sent to the debtor before the notice of default was recorded. The court
found that each of the notices were ineffective to give the debtor clear and unequivocal notice of
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acceleration. Notably,

court found that a notice

threatening future action in the event

of non-payment did not constitute acceleration. Id. at 752. Similarly, the District Court here
found that the January 22, 2008 notice sent to the Baughmans " ... was to inform the Baughmans
that they had failed to make scheduled monthly payments, to provide the amount of payments in
arrears, to demand payment and to warn the Baughmans that failure to catch up on the payments
could result in acceleration of the Note."

R. Vol. III, p. 631.

This demand sent to the

Baughmans was unambiguous and not effective to accelerate the Note. Id.
Significantly, the Crystal Properties court and the parties all agreed that the act of
recording the notice of default was legally sufficient to accelerate the note and thus trigger the
default interest provision. Crystal Properties, 268 F.3d at 747. The District Court here would
agree, having found that "[s]uch recording would clearly and unequivocally provide notice of
acceleration." R. Vol. III, pp. 9-10, n. 3. In the event that this Court disagrees that the Idaho
statute oflimitations to enforce a deed of trust specifically runs from the stated maturity date, it
must find that acceleration happened no earlier than the recordation of the notice of default.

III.

CONCLUSION

The irony here is striking. The Baughmans believe that their act of ignoring Defendants'
attempts to receive payment gives the Baughmans an argument for avoiding the entire debt. The
Baughmans have successfully avoided all responsibility for any deficiency owing after the
foreclosure by obtaining a bankruptcy discharge. Now, the Baughmans believe they are entitled
to have the property restored to them, which would effectively result in a million dollar windfall.
Defendants believe that the law and equity clearly point to the same result.
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the Baughmans' Partial Motion

Summary Judgment, award Defendants their

s fees and costs on appeal, and for such other relief as this Court deems equitable.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2016.
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an instrument of writing. [R. S. § 4053.J
HJs t.

tSee C. C. P. '81.

~

157 ) R . S.

etc.. and !ee'J tHegally eoltacted

§

by th&

41)S3. reen . R. C .- lb., ree n. C. L. ib.
Co1np. tcg.- cnt D itfer~nt, tlm-e two
years; C. C. P. ISiZ , !: 139; s ubd. 1 a s
a rne ntle d: K eri·'s c. tb.

c lerit, tH:c. 1 fro m th n c om'lt;, !1:o barred ttf ter
! 1)ur y-:;u-s. B,u111oc t-c Co. v. Bell Uil Ol ) 8
l. 1. ta P . 7Jtl.
.A n action by t hn c m :nt:y h) re cov e1· fr om

N . l>. AnaJog-0us: C. C. P. i 737!i.
Cited: Chemung M. Co. v. Han ky
(1904) 9 1. 7 86, 77 l?. 2 26 : :Bates v. Cap.$.
Bk. (hlilO) 1S L 429. 433. 110 P. 27 7:
B a shor v . Beloit {1 91 1 ) 30 r. S92. 59'7. 11 9

~tr:::n~';;!~s h~e 11~n D!~~ofi;~ 1

P. 55; HfHock v. li:.laho etc. Co. (191 2)

:t:.~~:gp::

~<:rl b~d by $t atut(, Js no l rm action "1q:,m1
n. HnbiH t y cr-e.at(til bl' stat ute-" but an actton

upon a contn1.c t, obltgation oi- liability. not
fo u ndc•d ttf}un n n fth:it n .un c n t o f w riti n g."

zz

Lin coln Co. v. "l'\vtn Fall& etc. Co. (1913)

I. HO, 1 26 P. al2. U L. R . ,\ . (N. S. ) 178 ;

23 [, <&3 , 130 P. 78 8.
ctoJ:ms ngnln~t ~UHe : A contra ct claim
agai nst the s ta te w111 be rte emed barred by
th e sta tute ot Hmi tatfon.s h t a proce,td ing
i:n t ht' s:urn·e m (: cour t fo r a r N:omu.h~Od:1.to1·y
d~eb{on ndvtslng th\! puyrne n t of such
chdm ,vh-E:H"1'~ the sa nw ts over 10 !rears past
du ,! a.r. d no 1/:.:cnse is sh own ten: the delay
of th e dafmant In presenUng It. Smn U v.
S. ( lO(H ) 10 l. l . 1G P. 76 5. ( S e e ij H !l.)

Tritthaxt v. 'l'rit thart { 191 3) 24 r. 1S ti, U 3
P. 121 ; MCL!'."Od v. Rogers (l!Hi) 2S I. 412,
15 4 P. 970; :Sofse Dev. Co. v. Boise (1917)
~rn .r. in 5, 161 P . 103 2; W eil v. Defenhach
(l1J1S) 3 :t l. 258. 170 P, 1 03 .

Action bl~ c ounty: An action by a connty to r ecove:r Crom th e clerk <)t' court. artdttor nnd record('<r, mon eys tHegaUy anow~d

by the county cotruniss!oners to the clerk ,

§ 6611. (4054JStatutory liabilities, trespass, trover, r eplevin and
fraud. Within three years ;
1. An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a pen-

alty or forfeiture.
2. An action for trespass upon teal property.
3. An a ction for t aking, detaining or injuring any goods or ch attels,
including a ctions for t h e specific recovery of perso nal property.
4. An a ction for re lief on the ground of fraud or mistake. T he
cause of action in su ch case not to be deemed to have accrued until the
discovery, by the aggrieved par ty, of t he facts constituting the frau d or
mistake. (R. S. § 4054.J
I ,rn P.
Tii;o,t.
{See C. C. P . '8 I., ~ t53:) n. s. §
~reu v. D efenha.ch,
I.
4054, r 0en . R . C . ib. , r ec•n. C. L . i b.
Comp. leg.---OU. Same: C. C. P. 1 S72.
I 33 8: KO<<'s C. ib.
~ . l),
A nalogous : C . C. P . § 7 375.

Cited: Ca.ut wefl v. :\£cPherson <1S'93')
3 r. 1 21, 34 P . ll)!} 5, Chemung M. Co. v.
H1m!ey (19 0-t ) 9 I. 7S6. 77 P. 22 6: Bn.tes v.
Cap, S. Bk. ( 1910) 18 I . -1 29 , 433, 110 P .
27 7; Can ady v . Coe ur d'A icn <r r... Co. (1 :'H l)
21 I. 7 7. 9$, 110 P. S$0; (In brief ot couns el) Stoltz v. Scott (1912) 23 !. 104; (erro•
n couHJ:V £ts 5 4: 54) Oly.mpta i?tc. Co. v.
.Ke1'ns 09ta) 24 t. 481. ·' 96, 136 P . 2!H,i;
Plndel ,•. Holgat~ cut:;) 2H F. 3U, U7
C. C. A. 1$8. 349, Ann. Cas. 1916C 983 ;
Collman v. \"i:' anamatu:?r {19.LS ) 37 r. 342,

l'i iJ f'.
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1·1i:u11 ·, i s ·::11.: •,:.;,:1 o •n

1Jl' a

po r ti-0n vt a nothet· ai1d aUjus tme nt and set-

ttem e nf ot

an

a ccount$ is made, the liabU-

!t.y ot 1.m e C(>UtUY to the oth~r is Cl'(!fl.led by
l'i tn.tnte and ,m a ction to e n force s n c h llstni:lt~, mu st be ~r rou ght withi n th r <:f~ year s.
r"o r: v,1 n C r,, v. A<la (",') , r. ! ~:H \ :: !. 686.
ii'.. P . ':4 S.
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